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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Philip W. Savrin
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1995 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that have a significant impact on issues relating to trial
practice and procedure.
II.
A.

PLEADINGS

71meliness of a Jury Demand

Burns v. Lawther' involves the timeliness of a jury demand in federal
court. Burns, a federal inmate, claimed that he had received inadequate
medical care at a federal institution, and sued two physician's assistants
for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics.' Although
an Eighth Amendment claim, seeking legal relief, is triable to a jury,
Burns did not include a jury demand with his complaint.'
In lieu of an answer, the defendants-at the direction of the magistrate to whom the case was assigned-filed a "special report" consisting
of affidavits and documents disputing Burns' allegations. Nine months
after the special reports were filed, Burns amended his complaint to add
negligence claims against the existing defendants as well as the United

* Associate in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Clark University
(B.A. with high honors, 1981); Boston University (J.D. cum laude, 1985). Law Clerk to the
Honorable Harold L. Murphy of the Northern District of Georgia, 1988-1990. Member,
American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta Bar Association, Federal Bar
Association. The author acknowledges the assistance of Christian Garnett in bringing this
Article to completion.
1. 53 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1995).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. 53 F.3d at 1239.
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States of America, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA7). 4
At that point, Burns for the first time demanded a jury trial.
The magistrate decided to treat the special reports as motions for
summary
and, in passing on the issues, found a trial
necessary. judgment
The district court adopted the magistrate's
recommendation
that triable issues existed and proceeded to conduct a non-jury trial of
both the Bivens and the FTCA claims. The court thereafter entered
judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims and expressly found
that Burns had not made a timely demand for his case to be heard by a
jury
The Eleventh Circuit found the jury demand issue to be one of first
impression.' After examining the relevant rules, the appeals court
disagreed with the district court, and sent the case back for a jury trial.7
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that, under
Federal Rule. of Civil Procedure 38, a jury trial is waived if not
demanded in a timely manner, "not later than 10 days after the service
of the last pleading directed to [a jury) issue."8 The focus of the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion is on the definition of "pleading" within the
meaning of Rule 38. For assistance, the Eleventh Circuit looked to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7, which defines "pleadings" to include
the following: a complaint, an answer, a reply to counterclaim, an
answer to a cross claim, a third-party complaint, or a third-party
answer.9 Under the doctrine of inclusio unius, exclusio alterius, the

court of appeals held that the list in Rule 7(a) is specific and exclusive
of other documents that might be considered a "pleading."'0
In the court below, the district judge had construed the special reports,
filed at the magistrate's direction in response to the complaint, to be the
"last pleading" directed to the jury issue." The Eleventh Circuit found
this decision to be flawed because the reports, even though converted to
motions for summary judgment, were simply not "pleadings" within the
meaning of Rule 38.2 Consequently, Burns's jury demand, filed along
with his amended complaint which added the FTCA claims, was timely
as it predated the defendants' answers. 13

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1994).

53 F.3d at 1239-40.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id. at 1240.
I& at 1241.
Id.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
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After reaching the conclusion that the district court erred in refusing
to conduct a jury trial, the Eleventh Circuit applied a "harmless error"
analysis, in light of the court's factual findings on the non-jury issue
presented under the FTCA. Harmless error had not occurred, however,
because, pursuant to the reasoning in Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 4 a
non-jury proceeding cannot foreclose jury consideration of legal issues,
absent "imperative circumstances" that did not exist in this case.' 5
Consequently, the district court's deprivation of Burns's right to a jury
trial was reversible error.
B. Resolution Trust Corporation Cases
1. Necessity of a Rule 59 Motion in Removed Actions. In
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bakker,' the Eleventh Circuit discussed the
proper procedure for appealing district court judgments in cases where
the Resolution Trust Corporation has been appointed as a receiver for a
savings and loan institution following an award against the savings and
loan in state court.' 7 In dicta in a previous case, Jackson v. American
Savings Mortgage Corp.,'" the Eleventh Circuit had hinted that a Rule
59 motion to modify or vacate the judgment would need to be filed to
preserve issues for review.' In Bakker, the court converted Jackson's
dicta into a holding.
The facts of the case are as follows. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association sued the Bakkers in state court for breach of contract, and
the Bakkers counterclaimed on various theories. After a trial on the
merits where both parties prevailed in part, the state court set aside
Bakkers' award. While an appeal was pending, Resolution Trust
Corporation ("RTC") was appointed as receiver of First Federal, filed a
notice of substitution with the state court, and removed the case to
federal court. Five months later, the Bakkers filed a Rule 59 motion
asking the district court to vacate the state court order. Although the,
district court denied the motion and refused to rule on the merits, it held
the motion was timely because it found the ten-day limit on Rule 59
motions to be discretionary and 2not
to begin in any event until the
0
district court has issued an order.

14. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
15.
16.

53 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 511).
51 F.3d 242 (11th Cir. 1995).

17. Id. at 244.
18. 924 F.2d 195 (11th Cir. 1991).
19. 51 F.3d at 244 (citing Jackson, 924 F.2d at 199).
20. Id. at 243-44.
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, though it disagreed with the lower
court's analysis.2 1 It expressed a concern that federal courts not
become a "super appellate" court for state court judgments, but noted at
the same time that the RTC has additional defenses it can assert after
it has been appointed as a receiver and removed a pending action to
federal court.22 It also found no support for the district court's conclusion that the ten-day time period for bringing a Rule 59 motion is
"discretionary" with the trial judge or that an order directing that such
a motion be filed is at all necessary' 2 It also ruled that there must be
some type of procedural vehicle to enable appellate court*review of a
district court's judgment in cases removed by the RTC in this circumstance.24 It therefore established the following procedure' "A party
must file a Rule 59 motion within ten days of removal to preserve its
right to appeal. If a timely Rule 59 motion is filed, the district court
must consider and decide the substance of that motion as it would had
On the facts before it, the
the judgment originated in federal court.'
Eleventh Circuit then found that the Bakkers had waived their right to
challenge the state court judgment by not filing a timely Rule 59
motion. 2' Accordingly, the district court's denial of the motion was
affirmed, albeit on different grounds for reasons contrary to those
expressed by the district court. 27 At a minimum, the decision in Bakker
clarifies the procedure to be followed whenever the RTC removes a
pending action to federal court following entry of judgment by the state
court.
2. Time for Removal by Resolution Trust Corporation. In
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fragetti,28 Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC") wasappointed receiver of Carteret Savings Bank in six separate
29
mortgage foreclosure suits filed in state court against the defendants.
RTC filed notices of substitution and removal to federal court under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA").30 The district court remanded the actions to state court,
however, finding that the removals were filed more than ninety days

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 246.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
49 F.3d 715 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 716.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(IX3XA) (Supp. 1994).
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after the period allowed by FIRREA. In so ruling, the district court
construed the ninety day period as commencing on the date the RTC was
appointed as receiver.3'
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the 1991 amendment to
FIRREA provided a clear and unambiguous definition of substitution,
which specifies Congress' intent for the removal period to commence
when a document is filed noticing a state court of a party's appointment
as receiver and not when the party is actually appointed.82 Because
RTC filed its notices of removal on the same day that it filed the orders
of appointment, the removal was timely in each case.33 The court of
appeals rejected the defendants' argument that such a definition of
substitution would allow a party unfettered control over removal because
it can control the timing of substitution.' FIRREA provides that any
party may file a notice of receiver with a state court, thereby triggering
the running of the ninety-day removal period. 5 Finally, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that its position contradicted that reached in
Carteret Savings Bank v. Diedrick." As an unpublished opinion,
however, Diedrick is non-binding precedent, and the court declined to
follow its analysis.3'

III. DISTRICT COURT'S JURISDICTION
Service of Process on a ForeignDefendant
3 8 addresses the revised Federal Rule of Civil
Silvious v. Pharaon
Procedure 4 regarding service of process on an agent of the defendant.
Silvious had been a depositor at the Bank of Credit & Commerce
International ("BCCI") and brought suit against Pharaon, as owner and
operator of BCCI, for fraud. Pharaon, who was the subject of criminal
proceedings as well, had apparently left the United States and was
believed to be residing in Saudi Arabia. Silvious made numerous
attempts to serve Pharaon by various methods and, after about a year
and a half, served an individual in Georgia who was alleged to be
Pharaon's agent. After Pharaon failed to answer the complaint following

A.

31.

49 F.3d at 716-17.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717-18.
8 F.3d 36 (11th Cir. 1993).
49 F.3d at 718.

38.

54 F.3d 697 (llth Cir. 1995).
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service on this individual, Silvious moved for entry of default judgment
against Pharaon. 8
In reviewing Silvious' motion for default judgment, the magistrate
addressed the adequacy of service on the agent. The magistrate
concluded that Rule 4(e), which allows for service on an agent, did not
apply because Pharaon was physically outside the country. The district
court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the
complaint for lack of proper service.4
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceed-,
ings.41 Specifically, the appeals court discussed that amended Rule
4(e), which provides for service on an agent, applies by its express terms

to individuals within a judicial district of the United States. 42 The

Eleventh Circuit construed this statute to apply to the place where
service is effected, not necessarily where the defendant resides."
Significantly, in revising Rule 4, the advisory committee had demonstrated an intent to widen, not restrict, the reach of service." Because
service was made within a judicial district of the United States, the
Eleventh Circuit continued, service could be proper if the individual
served was, in fact, an agent of Pharaon. 4' The Eleventh Circuit
therefore reversed the district court and46remanded for an analysis of
service under the provisions of Rule 4(e).

B. Higher EducationAct
In Bartels v. Alabama Commercial College,47 former college students
brought suit to rescind student loan contracts and to enjoin the federal
agencies to those contracts from pursuing collection efforts, claiming the
contracts had been coerced fraudulently. The district court dismissed
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had
failed to show federal question jurisdiction.'
Plaintiffs moved for

reconsideration based on a "sue and be sued" provision contained in the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

698-700.
699-700.
702.
701 n.9.
701.
702.

46. Id.
47. 54 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 1995).
48. Id. at 703-05.
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Higher Education Act ("HEA").4 9 The district court again declined to
find jurisdiction. 0
In vacating the district court's ruling, the Eleventh Circuit employed
the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation analysis from American
National Red Cross v. S.G., 5 in which the Court held that a "sue and
be sued" provision can be read to confer federal jurisdiction but only if
the clause specifically mentions the federal courts.52 The court of
appeals determined that section 1082(a)(2) of the HEA specifically refers
to the federal courts and thus confers jurisdiction over actions involving
Specifically, the words "sue and be
federal student loan programs.'
sued" in the provision provide a separate and independent jurisdictional
grant irrespective of the jurisdictional overlap in the remainder of the
provision."s

Although the analysis in American National Red Cross

involved a "sue and be sued" clause for federally chartered corporations,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the analysis was particularly applicable
to cases involving federal agencies.55
IV.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FinalJudgment Rule
In Shannon v. Jack Eckerd Corp.,5" Shannon filed suit against the
defendant following a denial for pre-authorization of his benefits under
a health plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security

A.

Act. In his suit, Shannon sought to recover the refused benefits and a

declaration of a right to future benefits. Following a bench trial, the
district court held that the denial of benefits was arbitrary and
capricious and remanded the claim to a Plan Administrator for a new
determination. The district court also held that Shannon's request for
a declaration of his right to future benefits was premature.5 7
The defendant appealed, but before briefs were filed on the merits the
Eleventh Circuit raised sua sponte the question of its appellate
jurisdiction to review the district court's order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

49. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2) (1994).
50. 54 F.3d at 706.
51.

112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 2471.
54 F.3d at 707.
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 708.

56. 55 F.3d 561 (1995).

57. Id. at 562-63.
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§ 1291, which limits appeals to final judgments of the district court."
The Eleventh Circuit then found it lacked jurisdiction, essentially for
three reasons. First, the district court's remand order did not constitute
a final judgment because it did not end the litigation on the merits:
further action in the nature of a redetermination of benefits was
indicated."
Second, the remand order did not dispose of all the
plaintiffs requests for relief but only considered his request as to future
benefits.' ° Finally, the Eleventh Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction because the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule did
not apply. 1 Under this exception, orders that are collateral to the
merits are appealable despite the lack of finality.6 2 Here, in contrast,
the district court's remand order was not completely separate from, but
instead was merged with, the merits of Shannon's claim." Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction."
B.

Collateral OrderDoctrine
The collateral order exception to the final judgment rule was rejected
as well in Winfrey v. School Board of Dade County."' Winfrey, a former
school principal, sued the Dade County School Board, the Superintendent and the Acting Superintendent, alleging race and gender discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment on two of six
counts as well as to the individual defendants based on qualified
immunity. Winfrey appealed the grants of summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds to the individual defendants.'
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision.67 In multiparty and multiclaim cases, the
court reasoned, a decision disposing of less than all claims against all
defendants is not final absent a certification of finality by the district
court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 68 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that, pursuant to the collateral order
doctrine, district court orders denying summary judgment on qualified

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 563.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 564.
59 F.3d 155 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 157.
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immunity grounds can be appealed separate from other claims."' After
noting that it had not ruled on the issue previously, the court then held
that grants of summary judgment are not appealable, prior to final
judgment, under the collateral order doctrine.7"
C. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction
The decision in Haney v. City of Cumming7 recognized the Supreme
Court's recent rejection, in Swint v. Chambers County Commission,72
of the Eleventh Circuit's exercise of pendent jurisdiction over additional
issues when an appeal arises based on an appealable issue. 8
In Haney, plaintiffs brought a multiclaim action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the multiple defendants based on the suicide of a prisoner
in her jail cell. Following the completion of discovery, the district court
granted summary judgment as to two defendants and denied it to others
based on qualified immunity. Summary judgment on other issues was
denied.74
On appeal, the parties for whom summary judgment was denied
sought exercise by the Eleventh Circuit of discretionary jurisdiction
given that the case was properly before the Court on the denial of
qualified immunity.7 The Eleventh Circuit, however, found its review
limited to the qualified immunity denials, in light of the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Swint.76 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that Swint controlled the issue, as the non-qualified immunity issues
were not "inextricably interwoven" with the qualified immunity
question.7 7 Accordingly, only the denials of qualified immunity could
be considered on appeal.7"
D. Mootness
In Brooks v. Georgia State Board of Elections, 79 the Eleventh Circuit
discussed the mootness doctrine in the context of an appeal from a
district court's rejection of a settlement agreement. Plaintiffs challenged

69.

Id. at 158.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995).
115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995).
69 F.3d at 1101.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id. at 1102 n.6.
Id. at 1102.
59 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1995).
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the state of Georgia's system of electing judges for state court, superior
court and court of appeals and justices of the supreme court as violative
of the Voting Rights Act' and the United States Constitution. A three
judge panel held that the system had the potential for discriminating
against minority voters and enjoined subsequent elections or appointments that were not precleared. The parties later reached a proposal
agreement that was approved by the Attorney General of the United
States and conditioned upon the approval of the district court. The
district court certified a Plaintiff class encompassing all present and
future black registered voters in Georgia. Following a fairness hearing,
the district court denied the parties' joint motion for approval of the
settlement based on constitutional concerns and the plaintiffs appealed."1
In denying their appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first determined that the
issue before the court was rendered moot due to several intervening
events which made it impossible for the court to grant effective relief 2
The terms of the settlement could no longer be implemented because
some of the deadlines contained in the agreement for increasing the
number of black judges on the bench had expired." Further, any
decision on the merits by the court would be purely advisory, thereby
violating the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United
States Constitution. 4
On appeal, the plaintiffs' counsel suggested that the appeal could
escape mootness by the Eleventh Circuit's approval of the settlement
"now for then" and modification of the terms by either the court of
appeals or the district court.8" The Eleventh Circuit vigorously rejected
this suggestion and reemphasized Article III's case or controversy
requirement. 6 The court also noted the lack of authority to support
the proposition that federal courts are authorized to alter the terms of
voluntary agreements between parties in order to afford effective relief
and avoid the mootness doctrine.8 7 Appellate courts are not free to
modify settlement provisions but rather must simply determine if the
lower court abused its discretion in approving or rejecting the settlement. 8 The court of appeals acknowledged some exceptions to the

80.

42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).

81. 59 F.3d at 1116-18.
82. Id. at 1119.
83. Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1118-19.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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mootness doctrine exist, but quickly dismissed them as inapplicable to
the present case.89 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal
as moot without remanding or vacating the district court's order."
E. Remands to State Court
The Eleventh Circuit in In re First National Bank of Boston,9 made
clear that district courts are without the discretionary authority to
remand sua sponte cases based on procedural defects within the thirtyday period after filing of a removal notice."' A loan customer brought
suit in state court against First National Bank of Boston (Bank of
Boston), claiming damages for failure to correct credit information. After
Bank of Boston removed the suit to federal court based on diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, the district court sua sponte remanded the case
back to state court based on Bank of Boston's failure to allege a state of
incorporation for diversity purposes. The district court denied the bank's
motion for reconsideration, in which the bank had argued, apparently
correctly, that it had no state of incorporation given its status as a
national bank. The district court struck the reconsideration motion on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction following the remand order.93
Bank of Boston appealed the rulings to the Eleventh Circuit, seeking
a writ of mandamus to reinstate the case in federal court.9' The
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court had acted erroneously,
given that Bank of Boston indeed has no state of incorporation and that
federal subject matter jurisdiction did exist over the dispute."5 In order
to reach the merits of the district court's decision, however, the Eleventh
Circuit had to first analyze whether the removal statute, specifically 28
U.S.C. § 1447, allowed the district court's order to be reviewed. 6 The
difficulty arose because section 1447(d) provides that remands to state
court are non-reviewable.9 7 Section 1447(c), however, requires procedural errors in the removal procedure to be corrected by way of motion
only."8 Because the bank's failure to allege a state of incorporation
would be a procedural error, had it been error at all, the Eleventh

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1120-21.
Id. at 1122.
70 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1186.
Id.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1187.
Id.
Id.
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Circuit reasoned, the district court could not sua sponte remand the
case.99 Instead, procedural errors are to be policed solely by the
parties."' °

In an interesting dissent, Judge Black accused the majority of making
bad law.' 0 ' She agreed that the district court had erred by finding
removal improper, but insisted that the removal statute precluded
appellate review of that decision. 2 She did not approve of the
distinction between procedure and jurisdiction drawn by the majority,
finding it was an "end run" around the statute.'" Given Judge Black's
dissent and the fact that the majority pegged its ruling on the district
court's inability to sua sponte raise procedural errors in the removal
procedure, it remains to be seen whether a district court's error in
remanding a case would be reviewable upon motion of the plaintiff.
F

Bankruptcy Appeals
A Chapter 13 debtor in In re Seidler,"o brought a declaratory action
against her mortgage holders, the Russos, under the Bankruptcy
Code, ' 5 challenging the validity of a mortgage lien on her home. The
bankruptcy court found that Seidler had satisfied the mortgage and
ordered that it be recorded with the city public records office to remove
the lien. The court rejected the mortgage holders' claims for relief, and
they appealed.0 6 The district court entered a stay of confirmation of
Seidler's debt plan, but the Russos failed to post the required bond and
the stay
never arose. Instead, the district court confirmed the debt
07
plan. 1

The Russos then attempted to file an adversary proceeding in the
bankruptcy court that was later dismissed without prejudice. The
bankruptcy court held that if the Russos were successful on their appeal
to the district court, then a new adversary proceeding could be filed that
would relate back to the original date of filing. The district court
subsequently granted Seidler's motion to dismiss, and the Russos
appealed.' 8

99.

Id.

100.
101.
102,
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1190 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1190-91.
Id.
44 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 1995).
11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
44 F.3d at 946-47.

107.

Id.

108. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the district court
erroneously premised its dismissal on the assumption that section 1327
of the Bankruptcy Code moots a potential creditor's appeal from an
adversary proceeding for failure to procure a stay of a plan confirmation. 1 ' Section 1327 controls the effect of a plan confirmation and is
premised on the idea that issues not appropriate for decision are not
barred."1 While section 1327 may have some preclusory effect upon
certain issues addressed by the confirmation, the court of appeals
pointed to the absence of authority holding that section 1327 is capable
of mooting an appeal of issues not considered by the confirmation.'
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that allowing confirmation to moot an
appeal would undermine the protective nature of adversary proceedings
under the Bankruptcy Code.1 2 Further, relief was still available to
the Russos in the form of an adversary proceeding to revoke the plan
and enforce the lien."' Consequently, the Russos failure to obtain a
stay of proceedings did not4 moot their appeal of the bankruptcy court's

order to remove the lien.1

V.

ARBITRATION

Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen,"' a brokerage firm ("Merrill Lynch") filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin an
investors' arbitration claim made before the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD"), on the ground that the arbitration was
time-barred. After the investors successfully moved for removal, the
district court granted their motion to 'compel arbitration, holding that
was to be decided by an
the issue of the arbitration's timeliness
6
A.

arbitration panel, not a federal court."

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the case was one of
first impression in the circuit." 7

It cited to the NASD's Code of

Arbitration and noted that the courts would not interfere with an
agreement to arbitrate-provided the parties' intent to arbitrate is based

109. Id. at 948.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 948-49.
112. Id. at 949.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 382.
Id at 383.
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on "clear and unmistakable evidence.""' The court considered section
35 Code of Arbitration, which requires an arbitrator to interpret and
determine the applicability of the Code. 9 Although section 15 of the
Code addresses timeliness of arbitration claims, the Eleventh Circuit
found insufficient evidence of the parties' intent to allow the arbitrator
to determine timeliness. 2 Consequently, the district court's decision
was reversed.'
B. Damages Awardable and Standardof JudicialReview
In Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 22 an investor initiated
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association against
Prudential Securities, Inc. ("PSI"), alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence as well as violations of federal and state laws.
Following an arbitration hearing, a panel awarded Davis compensatory
and punitive damages and assessed each party their own costs and
attorney fees. In state court, the plaintiff sought attorney fees,
confirmation of the arbitration award and modification of the award to
the extent the arbitrators ruled on the issue of attorney fees. PSI
removed to federal district court which granted Davis' motion to confirm
and denied the motion for modification of the award for attorney
fees."
Before turning to the merits of the arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted a new standard of review recently established by the Supreme
Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan. 24 In rejecting the
usual "abuse of discretion" standard, the Supreme Court in Kaplan held
that a district court's confirmation of an arbitration award should be
reviewed by examining questions of law de novo and accepting findings
of fact that are not clearly erroneous. "'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's confirmation of the
punitive damages award, recognizing the authority of an arbitrator to
award any remedy or relief deemed just and equitable and within the
26
scope of the parties' agreement, irrespective of contrary state law.1
The court of appeals relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in

11S.

Id.

119. I& at 384.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.at 385.
59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1187-88.
115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
Id. at 1926.
59 F.3d at 1188-89.
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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman127 which held that, under the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), state law can not overcome the terms
of an arbitration agreement." =
The Eleventh Circuit further affirmed the lower court in finding that
the award of punitive damages did not violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment."2 Judicial review of an arbitration agreement is limited to only four bases for vacatur by the FAA, which
presumes that these agreements will be confirmed unless the "arbitration has been tainted in specified ways." 3 ' In rejecting PSI's assertion
that due process requires more stringent review, the court of appeals
held that only state action is subject to scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause.' 3 ' The state action requirement for due process claims is
absent in private arbitration cases and the limited state action involved
in confirmation of arbitration awards, does not rise to the level of the
Due Process Clause.3 2 The court reasoned that the Congressional
policy in the FAA of favoring arbitration plus the lack of bias in
arbitration ensures that the problem of "runaway punitive damages" in
the court systems is less likely to arise in arbitration.' The Eleventh
Circuit also emphasized the voluntary nature of arbitration and
admonished PSI for requiring its customers to arbitrate and then later
complaining about the adequacy of the procedures in the forum of its
In sum, the court of appeals found that the punitive
choice.'
damages award by the district court did not violate due process and to
constitutionalize arbitration would dilute its effectiveness and appeal as
an alternative forum."
As for the plaintiffs claim for modification as to the attorney fees, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court because the issue was never
submitted to arbitrators.'36 The court of appeals held that the arbitration panel's knowledge of a statute providing for the award of attorney
fees did not constitute submission and the arbitrators exceeded their
authority in deciding the issue.'37

127.

115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).

128. Id. at 1216.
129. 59 F.3d at 1190.
130. Id. (quoting Robbins v. Day, 954 F.3d 679, 683 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
201 (1992)).

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1190-91.
1191-92.
1192-93.
1193.
1193-94.
1194-95.
1195.
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MISCELLANEOUS

Statute of Limitations in Age DiscriminationCases
In Edwards v. Shalala,'" the Eleventh Circuit decided an issue of
first impression in the circuit concerning the applicable statute of
limitations for an age discrimination case brought by a federal employee
in federal court.'3 9 Edwards, an employee of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), brought such a
lawsuit in 1990 under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 140 complaining of acts dating back to 1986. HHS asserted that
the action was time-barred. In ruling on HHS' limitations defense, the
district court found that the statute under which Edwards traveled did
not expressly provide a relevant limitations period. The district court
granted HHS' motion, finding that the statute of limitation under the
age discrimination statute relating to private employers applied."
On appeal, Edwards argued that the district court erred in applying
section 626(e) because section 633a(f) specifically provides that all
section 633a claims are independent of all other provisions contained in
the ADEA. He claimed, instead, that the appropriate period is the sixyear statute of limitations for non-tort civil claims against the United
States under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 42 While the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged the need to "borrow" an appropriate period of limitations
from an analogous statute, it rejected the six-year period espoused by
Edwards.'
Based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Stevens v.
Department of the Treasury,'" the court of appeals held that the sixyear period is too general in its application in light of other statutes
which are more similar to the ADEA.' 45 The court found it inconsistent that Congress would allow a broader six-year period for suits
against the government yet provide only a two- or three-year period for
private suits.
The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed
the district
47
court's decision that Edwards' claim was time-barred

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

64 F.3d 601 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 603.
29 U.S.C. § 626.
64 F.3d at 603.
Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 605.

144. 500 U.S. 1 (1991).
145. 64 F.3d at 605.

146. Id.
147. Id. at 607.
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B. Application of FederalRules of Evidence in Diversity Cases
In Wood v. Morbark Industries, Inc.,"4 a widow brought a strict
liability suit against Morbark Industries for the death of her husband,
alleging that a wood chipper used in the husband's employment was
defective and unreasonably dangerous. The district court granted
Morbark's motion in limine to exclude post-accident design change
evidence but with the caution against opening the door to later
admission of such evidence. Subsequently, the district court allowed
Wood's counsel to elicit testimony as to design changes in the wood
chipper because Morbark's counsel misled the jury. After a jury verdict
in favor of Morbark, the district court denied Wood's motion for a new
trial.

149

Wood appealed the judgment to the Eleventh Circuit on several
grounds. One of the issues addressed in the appeal was whether Florida
or federal law governed the admissibility of the post-accident remedial
measures taken by Morbark. Wood maintained that Florida law should
apply, given that the case was founded on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction such that Florida's product liability law applied. For
support, Wood pointed to a decision by the Tenth Circuit'50 holding
in product liability cases in
that state law governs evidentiary rulings
51
the face of contradictory federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Wood's position and expressly
declined to follow the Tenth Circuit's lead. 52 Instead, based on
Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court found that Federal Rule of
Evidence 407, which addresses the use of post-accident remedial
measures, is a procedural rule and therefore applicable in a product
liability case based on Florida law, regardless of Florida's evidentiary
Accordingly, the admissibility of this type of
rules in such cases."
evidence in Wood's case was controlled by Rule 407 and not state
law."

148. 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1995).
149. Id. at 1203-05.
150. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Brequet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984).

151.
152.
153.
154.

70 F.3d at 1207.
Id. at 1207-08.
Id.
Id
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C. Costs and Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Cases
The Eleventh Circuit in DAguanno v. Gallagher,' extended the
qualified immunity defense to include attorney fees, costs, and litigation
expenses in suits brought against public officials in their individual
capacities." Homeless persons brought a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against a county sheriff and sheriff deputies in their
individual capacities for entering a homeless campsite located on private
property and destroying shelters and personal property. Plaintiffs
alleged violations of both federal and state constitutional rights and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to money damages.
Plaintiffs also sought to recover their attorney fees and litigation costs.
motion for summary judgment
The district court granted the defendants'
57
based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields public officials in civil cases from the
burdens of litigation, including liability for money damages, if their
conduct violates no "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.""s The Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court as to the plaintiffs' state law claims,
holding that qualified immunity is a defense only to federal claims. 59
The court further held that qualified immunity did not bar the plaintiffs'
injunctive and declaratory claims because the defense only applies to
monetary claims." °
Having found that the district court incorrectly granted summary
judgment on the nonmonetary claims, the court of appeals reviewed the
record concerning the plaintiffs federal monetary claims." 1 With
respect to the plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims, the court found
that the district court properly upheld the qualified immunity defense. 2 The court then ruled that, for qualified immunity purposes,
damages include costs, attorney fees and litigation costs in suits brought
against defendants in their individual capacities." Allowing these
damages would severely undercut the policy behind qualified immunity
of protecting public officials from monetary personal liability, especially

155. 50 F.3d 877 (11th Cir. 1995).

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 881.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 880-81.
Id.
Id. at 881.
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since such damages are often in excess of a plaintiffs other recovery.'"
More importantly, the court explained, Congress did not intend for the
granting of such damages in civil rights actions and, if a defendant has
qualified immunity for damages, he also has good faith immunity for the
For support, the Eleventh Circuit noted
purposes of attorney fees.
that although 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows plaintiffs, as prevailing parties,
to recover the attorney fees, that statute does not "require" such an
award against defendants in their individual capacities. Consistent with
the above, the court concluded that qualified immunity protects
defendants in their individual capacities from being held liable for fees
and costs when the lawsuit is solely for injunctive or declaratory
relief.16
VII.

CONCLUSION

As in past surveys of the Eleventh Circuit's cases involving trial
practice and procedure, this year's review adds many new rules to the
federal landscape. The court continues to define the limited nature of
federal court jurisdiction, both at the trial and the appellate levels, and
has issued opinions of far reaching significance in different substantive
areas. There were quite a few issues of first impression as well. Given
the complexities of federal court practices, the cases highlighted in this
article will hopefully provide clarity and guidance to the bench and bar.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 882.
166. Id. at 881-82.

